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I. Introduction 
 
Colombia’s financial system has experienced important transformations during the last two 
decades. In order to illustrate the most significant modifications, Tables 1 and 2 present a 
summary of the financial system’s structure during four different points in time: 1986-
1989, 1990, 1995, and 2001. Table 1 shows the assets of different types of banks (private 
domestic banks, foreign banks and state-owned banks), Savings and Loans corporations, 
and the rest of the financial system, all of them as a proportion of GDP. Table 2 
complements the information by presenting the participation of each financial intermediary 
in the total assets of the financial system. The following facts are of interest: 
 
•  In the second half of the 1980s, Colombia’s financial system had 91 financial 
institutions with assets equivalent to 46% of GDP. State-owned banks held 
approximately 43% of the financial system’s assets (20% of GDP), banks with 
foreign participation only 3% (1%), private domestic banks 20% (9%), Savings and 
Loans corporations 15% (7%), and the rest of the financial system 20% (9 of GDP). 
 
•  During the first half of the 1990s, the number of financial institutions increased 
considerably. It peaked in 1995 with 148 institutions, and total assets equivalent to 
68% of GDP The participation of state-owned banks in the total assets of the 
financial system fell in a significant manner, reaching 13% in 1995. The loss in 
participation of state-owned banks was initially gained by other non-banking 
financial institutions, whose share in the financial system’s assets increased from 
20% during 1986-1989, to 37% in 1990. This participation, however, decreased to 
28% in 1995. The 1990s fall of state-owned banks and other non-banking financial 
institutions participation in the total assets of the system was replaced in equal 
proportion by foreign banks, Savings and Loans corporations and private domestic 
banks.   
 
•  In the second half of the 1990s the financial system’s assets fell by 6.4% of GDP. 
The biggest decrease was recorded by the state-owned banks (2.9%), followed by   3 
the Savings and Loans corporations and other non-banking financial institutions 
(3.3%). However, at the same time, the size of private domestic banks increased by 
1.7% of GDP together with the size of foreign banks by 0.5%. The number of 
financial institutions dropped to 105, slightly higher than before the structural 
reform process began during the period of 1989-1992. The configuration of 
financial conglomerates in the intermediation process also increased its importance. 
At the beginning of the decade, the financial intermediation was done in its majority 
by individual financial institutions, while towards 1999, the financial conglomerates 
owned close to 70% of the assets of the intermediation system. This characteristic 
moved the Colombian financial system in the direction of a universal banking 
scheme through a process of mergers and liquidations. 
 
This paper studies the main driving forces behind this transformation. It is argued that the 
rapid structural change undergone by the Colombian financial system in the last ten years 
can be explained by the liberalization of the early 1990s, the inflow of FDI to the financial 
sector, the privatization of state-owned institutions, and the effects of the credit boom and 
the subsequent financial crisis that occurred during the decade. Furthermore, specific 
lessons are drawn from the experience of the hardest hit sub-sectors of the financial system. 
 
II. Financial Liberalization  
 
At the beginning of the 1990s Colombia’s financial sector was characterized by its reduced 
size, segmented and oligopolistic structure, and a dominant presence of the State, which 
held 50% of the banking system assets. The sector was severely repressed and was highly 
inefficient. The reserve requirements surpassed 40% of the total deposits and the interest 
rate spreads exceeded those of the developed countries by more than 500 basis points
1. In a 
context of high inflation and directed subsidized credit, the banking sector concentrated 
most part of its voluntary credits in maturities of one year or less, limiting the long term 
financing to the indexed system of Savings and Loans. 
                                                           
1 Barajas et al. “The impact of Liberalization and Foreign Direct Investment in Colombia´s Financial Sector”. 
Journal of Development Economics, vol. 23 pp. 157-196.   4 
During the period of 1990-1992 Colombia begun an ambitious program of economic 
modernization oriented to improve the efficiency of resource allocation and increase 
competitiveness. Such program included a group of structural reforms and macroeconomic 
policies designed to achieve a 5% annual real GDP growth and a significant reduction in 
the rate of inflation. The main components of the program consisted of establishing an open 
economy (Law 9 of 1991) and a financial liberalization. With respect to the Central Bank, 
its monopoly over the purchase and sale of foreign currency was eliminated, and its 
functioning was designed as an independent central bank (Law 32 of 1992)
2.  
 
Regarding the financial sector, Laws 45 of 1990 and 35 of 1993 redefined the role and 
structure of the financial system. Among other things, these laws simplified the entry and 
exit rules, established a scheme close to universal banking aimed at reducing specialization, 
and introduced more strict prudential regulation. The main idea of the reforms was to 
introduce more competition among the financial intermediaries in search for higher 
efficiency, and lower spreads and lending rates. 
 
As a result of the reforms, the process of re-privatization of the institutions that were 
nationalized following the financial crisis of the early 1980s gained momentum. In 
addition, there was an increasing access of Colombia’s businesses to external credit and the 
foreign direct investment in the financial sector was encouraged.  
 
III. FDI in the financial system 
 
 
1.  Background 
 
The seventies and eighties in Colombia were a period of severe restrictions to foreign 
investment in general, and most particularly to that directed to the financial sector. The 
Decree Law 444 of 1967 gave the Government a set of tools to channel FDI towards the 
sectors considered “a priority for the economic development”. This meant that during years 
                                                           
2 Complementary policies were undertaken to rationalize the public sector, improve transport infrastructure,   5 
no foreign investment was approved in the financial sector. Later, the Law 75 of 1975 
applied to the financial sector the Decision 24 of the Andean Pact. By this rule, the foreign 
banks were compelled to become joint ventures in a period no longer than three years. It 
was established that at least 51% of the property had to be in hands of Colombians and 
limits were established on the reinvestment and external transfers of profits. 
 
In practice, the conversion to joint ventures was obtained without the foreign investors 
relinquishing the control of their institutions, the financial joint ventures didn’t increase 
their capital and their relative size increased. All of this was contrary to the initial intention 
of the government to avoid a further portion of the domestic savings to be under the control 
of foreign hands
3. Furthermore, the direct foreign investment inflows in the financial 
system completely stagnated. According to the figures presented recently by Barajas et al., 
on average, the inflows of foreign investment in the financial system as a portion of the 
total foreign investment in the country decreased from 23% between 1975-1979, to 7.4%, 
4.5% and –3.9% in the following five-year periods, respectively. As a portion of the GDP 
the magnitude of these flows was negligible. During the crisis of the 1980s, the banks with 
shared property between nationals and foreigners had on average a slightly better 
performance than local banks
4.  
 
2.  Liberalization in the 1990s and results 
 
As stated before, at the beginning of the 1990s the restrictions on foreign investment in 
Colombia were significantly reduced. Law 9 of 1991 made possible the greatest 
transformations. This law established the foreign exchange principles upon which the 
government designed the statute of foreign investment: (i) the equality of treatment 
between nationals and foreigners and equal opportunities of investment; (ii) the universal 
access to all the sectors of the economy; and (iii) the automatic authorization for the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
support programs of business renewal and define a general framework for foreign investment. 
3 Barajas et al. 1999. p.160. 
4 In 1985, the capital-asset ratio of the domestic banks was 4%, while the joint venture banks maintained 
levels near to 6%. In the same way, the percentage of non-performing loans in the domestic banks exceeded 
by more than double the percentage of the banks with foreign capital (17% vs. 6%, respectively). Differences   6 
establishment of foreign investors in the country. For the financial sector this meant free 
entry of foreign investors to the country, all under the broader process of financial 
liberalization described above. 
 
The institutional changes had a positive effect over foreign investment in the financial 
sector. The banks that had been of foreign property before 1975, and were transformed into 
mixed property banks in the second half of the seventies or eighties, became once again 
foreign owned banks. Foreign investors bought banks that had been nationalized during the 
crisis of the 1980s and others that weren’t. Lastly, some banks entered Colombia for the 
first time. With this investment, the share of foreign banks in the total assets of the banks 
increased from 10% in the second half of the 1980s to more than 30% in 2000. The largest 
foreign banks are Citibank and the Spanish  Ganadero (BBV) and Santander. These banks 
have similar businesses as the domestic banks. The Ganadero and Santander banks also 
have an extensive number of branches in the country. The rest of the foreign banks are 
significantly smaller and their main activity is investment banking
5.    
 
Barajas et al. (1999) recently performed a detailed evaluation of the role of foreign banks in 
Colombia’s financial system. According to their descriptive analysis, foreign banks have 
less non-performing loans, less reserve requirements and are more productive than the 
domestic banks. Regardless of this, foreign banks don’t appear to work with lower spreads, 
possibly benefiting from the lack of competition inside the financial system. However, 
based on an econometric analysis, the authors conclude that the lower administrative costs 
and the better quality of the loans in the foreign banks have allowed these banks to establish 
spreads slightly inferior than those of the domestic banks. Moreover, the largest 
improvements in the indicators of the foreign banks have been observed in the 
intermediaries that were formerly government property. As a consequence, these banks 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
also existed in the average profits-asset ratio, even though they were negative for both groups. In the domestic 
banks was of –5% and in the foreign banks of –2%. 
5 Some institutions don’t have deposits from the public and most of them concentrate their risk by realizing 
depository and loan operations with triple-A sectors and multinationals. These types of institutions offer 
support to businesses oriented towards the international markets, related to commercial credit operations and 
the management of private foreign debt, and are involved actively in treasury management (e.g. the purchase 
and sale of foreign currencies).   7 
have operated with lower spreads than the rest of the foreign banks. Finally and 
interestingly enough, the authors find that increased competition from foreign banks may 
have resulted in “increased risk and a subsequent deterioration in loan quality” of domestic 




At the end of the 1980s, the financial intermediaries owned by the public sector represented 
around 40% of the assets of the entities of the credit sector. These intermediaries were 
classified into first floor and second floor intermediaries. The first floor intermediaries 
included a group funded with state-owned capital with a strong sectorial orientation, 
specially concentrated in the agricultural and livestock sector, as well as another group that 
became owned by the public sector during the financial crisis of the eighties. The latter 
maintained a balance structure similar to a private commercial bank´s structure
6. The 
second floor intermediaries comprised rediscount entities created during the 1980s with 
state-owned capital to focus on  sectorial objectives, or intermediaries created to replace the 




The privatization processes of the first floor credit establishments of the public sector took 
place between 1991 and 1996. The intermediaries that were privatized first, although not 
exclusively, were those who had been taken over by the government during the 1980s 
crisis
9. After 1996, and especially since the financial stress episodes in 1998 and 1999, the 
state-owned share in the banking industry has been influenced by the transfer of ownership 
of some private financial entities to the public sector and by merger processes within public 
intermediaries. Currently, the only first floor financial entities that are still owned by the 
                                                           
6  The Caja Agraria, Banco Cafetero, Banco Popular ad Banco Ganadero formed part of the first group while 
the Banco de Colombia,  Banco de los Trabajadores,  Banco del Estado, Banco del Comercio and  the Banco 
Tequendama formed part of the second group. 
 
7 The FEN and FINDETER belong to the first group, while the second group is formed by FINAGRO and 
Bancoldex. 
8 As of 1991 Banco de la República was prohibited to assign credit to non-financial legal persons.   8 
public sector are three commercial banks
10 and a financial corporation that supports the 
manufacturing industry. 
 
The aforementioned evolution is shown in Table 2.  For the first floor banking, between 
1990 and 1996 a pronounced decrease in the participation of public intermediaries 
occurred, both regarding the number of entities as well as in the assets value. That trend 
was mitigated from 1996 to 2001 due to the combined effect of the change of ownership of 
some entities and the mergers occurred within the state-owned banks. 
 
V. Credit boom and financial crisis
11 
 
Between 1991 and 1997 the Colombian financial system experienced an unprecedented 
credit boom. Total credit rose from 29.1% to 43.9% of GDP in that period (Graph 1). 
Deposits also expanded rapidly in the first part of the decade, climbing from a 25% of GDP 
in 1991 to 39.8% of GDP in 1997 (Graph 2).  
 
Between 1998 and 1999 the system went through a deep deterioration of its solvency and 
profitability, as well as a sharp contraction in credit growth. During those years financial 
system losses reached US$ 2514 million and net worth dropped by 31.1%. Credit annual 
real growth was -4.2% on average between 1998 and 2001 (Graph 3). The fall in the 
solvency ratios was related to the large increase in past due loans and non-performing 
assets, which reached historically high levels in this period (Graphs 4 and 5). Although the 
deterioration was widespread, the crisis was particularly severe in two sub-sectors of the 
financial system, namely the State-Owned banks and the Savings and Loans Corporations. 
 
The roots of the boom and the crisis can be traced to the following: (i) the atypically 
pronounced business cycle undergone by the Colombian economy in the past decade, (ii) 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
9 The Banco de los Trabajadores, Banco del Comercio,  Banco Tequendama, Banco Ganadero, Banco de 
Colombia and the Banco Popular were privatized during this process. 
10 One of them specializes in the agricultural and livestock sector credit and the remaining two banks 
specialize in mortgage credit. 
11 Zárate Juan P. and Urrutia, Miguel.  “La Crisis financiera de Fin de Siglo”. Mimeo. Banco de la República, 
2001.   9 
several vulnerabilities present in the structure of the financial system at the time, especially 
in the abovementioned sub-sectors, and (iii) some failures of the  supervisory and 
regulatory frameworks. These factors are discussed below. 
 
1.  Macroeconomic context 
 
During the 1990s the Colombian economy experienced a complete business cycle in which 
GDP expanded rapidly between 1991 and 1995, and slowed down between 1995 and 1999 
(Graph 6). In 1999 GDP actually dropped by more than 4%, the first contraction of output 
since the 1930s. This cycle was related to the capital flows that hit the economy throughout 
the period. 
 
In the early 1990s most restrictions on international capital flows were lifted in the context 
of a broader reform program aimed at improving the efficiency of resource allocation and 
increasing competitiveness. A surge in capital inflows ensued as part of the phenomenon 
observed elsewhere in the region. In Colombia, most of these inflows took the form of 
private sector long term lending, privatisation revenues and, later in the decade, public 
sector external borrowing. In addition, there were large FDI inflows directed at the oil 
industry. These flows promoted a sharp increase in private spending and allowed a 
sustained upward trend in public expenditure. Public and private savings rates diminished 
and current account deficits mounted (Graphs 7, 8 and 9). The Colombian peso appreciated 
in real terms, as there was an expansion in demand for non-tradable goods, housing among 
them. Domestic credit provided by the financial system grew at record high rates and asset 
prices (real estate in particular) experienced a bubble (Graphs 3 and 10). 
 
As a result of these events, both public and private domestic and external debt rose sharply, 
leaving the economy vulnerable to a fall in income or a shortfall of external financing. As 
for the financial system, the number of financial intermediaries went up from 91 between 
1986-1989 to 148 in 1995, and both deposits and loans surged, since the capital inflows 
were not completely sterilized. As it has been regularly observed in other episodes, fast   10
rates of credit expansion were coupled with a deterioration of the quality of credit 
allocation, thus increasing the vulnerability of the economy.  
 
Between 1997 and 1999, there was a reversal in capital inflows and a sharp decline in its 
terms of trade (Graphs 11 and 12), which induced an abrupt correction of aggregate 
expenditure and the current account deficit. A large real depreciation ensued, real interest 
rates reached near-record high levels while output fell by more than 4% in 1999, as 
mentioned above (Graph 13). Asset prices dropped and, in particular, real state prices fell 
by more than 27% in real terms between 1995 and 1999. 
 
The reversal in capital flows affected the financial system initially through a reduction in 
liquidity (as the Central Bank defended the exchange rate band) and an increase in the cost 
of funds. Later, the rise in the real interest rates and the economic slowdown caused a 
decline in the quality of the loan portfolio and the solvency ratios (Graphs 4 and 14). These 
indicators started to worsen as early as 1995, but they deteriorated deeper in 1998. The 
increased credit risk perception and the larger pressure of the public deficit domestic 
financing produced a credit crunch throughout 1999-2001
12. There was a shift in the 
composition of the banks´ assets towards government bonds and away from loans (Graph 
15). 
 
The impact of the downturn on the financial system through the interest and devaluation 
risks was less important and indirect. For once, most of the lending rates were linked to the 
deposit (90 day CD) rates, thus mitigating interest rate risk. The exception in this regard 
were the Savings and Loans Corporations, whose case will be described in some detail 
later. Furthermore, Central Bank regulation prevented the financial intermediaries from net 
exposure in foreign currency. Hence, the effect of the devaluation on the system occurred 
by way of a climb of the credit risk of those non-financial borrowers directly exposed in 
foreign currency.  
 
                                                           
12 Barajas et al. “¿Por qué en Colombia el crédito al sector privado es tan reducido?”. Borradores de 
Economía # 185. Banco de la República. 2001.   11
As mentioned before, the state-owned banks and the Savings and Loans Corporations were 
particularly hard hit by the crisis. These sub-sectors were characterized by structural 
vulnerabilities that impaired their ability to face the external shock adequately. Their cases 
are discussed now. 
 
2.  Savings and Loans Corporations 
 
a.  Background  
 
An important feature of the Colombian financial system in the last three decades was the 
existence of a relatively large subsector of savings and loans corporations called 
Corporaciones de Ahorro y Vivienda (henceforth CAVs) which specialized in long term 
mortgage and construction financing. CAVs were created in 1972 as an element of a 
strategy aimed at promoting economic growth throughout construction as the leading 
sector. They were in charge of providing inflation-indexed long term loans for construction 
projects and housing acquisition which they financed by means of inflation-indexed sight 
“saving” deposits and short term CDs for financing. Hence, from the outset there was a 
liquidity risk embedded in the design of these institutions. Such a risk, however, was dealt 
with through several “privileges” granted to CAVs: 
 
•  They were the only financial intermediaries authorized to offer saving 
accounts with non-negative real rates of return (other intermediaries 
could offer saving deposits with fixed interest rates below inflation). In a 
long term moderate inflation environment, this privilege gave in practice 
the quasi-monopoly of saving deposits to these institutions and 
guaranteed some stability to their liabilities. 
 
•  They were given special unrestricted and permanent access to a Central 
Bank facility (“FAVI”) which provided liquidity in case of deposit 
shortfalls and absorbed excess liquidity from CAVs. 
   12
On the assets side, CAVs were restricted to lend exclusively to the construction and 
housing sectors. Even their short term investments were restricted to be held in FAVI 
liabilities. Their capital requirements were lower than those of other intermediaries, on 
the belief that their loan portfolio had the “real” collateral represented by the fixed 
assets they financed
13.  Caps on the “real” interest rates of loans and deposits were in 
place throughout the existence of these institutions. 
 
The CAVs system functioned smoothly for more than 20 years. Sight saving deposits 
were a stable source of funding and CAVs became leaders in the transactional system, 
providing depositors with a large network of ATM and branches nationwide. They 
became an important sector in the financial system. Their share of total financial system 
assets went from 9.6% in the 1970s (4.1% of GDP), to 16.7% in the 1980s (8.2% of 
GDP) and to 23.2% in the 1990s (14.1% of GDP). The CAVs also weathered well the 
financial crisis of the 1980s, which affected mainly the commercial banks. 
 
However, the privileges granted to the CAVs introduced a long term distortion in credit 
allocation, reflected in the fact that in the past 25 years 28% of total financial system 
deposits were channelled through government intervention to finance the construction 
sector, which has represented merely 4.1% of GDP or 5.5% of the gross value of 
production.  
 
On the other hand, once the process of liberalization of the financial system was on its 
way since the early 1980s, the privileges enjoyed by the CAVs started to weaken. In 
1981 the interest rates on CDs issued by financial intermediaries were freed. Thus, 
CAVs suffered competition in the deposit side and their liquidity problems ensued, 
                                                           
13 The difference between capital requirements for mortgage and construction loans was also present in the 
Basle guidelines. For most of the 1980s, the required liabilities/net worth ratio was around 25 for the CAVs, 
while commercial banks had a requirement of 10. After 1991, the required risk-weighed assets/net worth ratio 
was 14 for CAVs and 12 for commercial banks. In 1992 the ratios for both types of intermediaries were 
equalized at 12 and in 1993 they were reduced to approximately 11.   13
since any rise in the CDs real interest rate meant a substitution of CAVs savings 
deposits for CDs issued by other intermediaries
14.      
 
b.  Liberalization and crisis 
 
The financial liberalization reforms of the early 1990s substantially changed the 
institutional arrangement surrounding the CAVs. Their quasi-monopoly of the saving 
deposits was eliminated (other intermediaries were allowed to offer savings deposits 
with market rates), as well as the restrictions on their loan portfolio and the loan 
portfolios of the other intermediaries. FAVI was dissolved and most financial 
institutions were left on equal standing in terms of their access to restricted, transitory 
and costlier LOLR facilities at the central bank
15. Higher capital requirements were 
established in 1989 for all institutions and the Basle guidelines were adopted 
afterwards.  
 
At the same time, CAVs shared the credit expansion phase of the business cycle 
examined before, and financed a construction and housing boom in which real state 
prices skyrocketed. 
At this point, the seeds for a crisis in the CAVs sector had already been planted: 
 
•  First, despite the fact that in 1994 the indexation formula for saving 
deposits and CAVs loans was defined as a fraction of the 90 day CD 
rates, competition on the deposit side forced them to rely more on 
indexed and peso-denominated CDs. The latter proved to be a costlier 
and less stable source of funds. Hence the interest rate and liquidity risks 
increased. This phenomenon plus the rise in interest rates prompted by 
the tightening of monetary policy in 1994 resulted in a sharp increase in 
the cost of funds for the CAVs. Their initial response was to raise the 
                                                           
14 This was the reason why the indexation formula used to keep the “real” value of loans and deposits began 
to be partially linked to the CD nominal rates in 1988. 
15  One of the main reasons for the elimination of FAVI was that it weakened the control of the monetary 
aggregates by the central bank.    14
spreads on new loans
16, but this led to a deterioration of the quality of 
the loan portfolio, especially after 1995, when the unemployment rate 
went up. 
 
•  The increased liquidity and interest rate risks were hard to deal with 
because of several reasons: 
i.  The market for instruments to hedge them (e.g. swaps) was not 
developed.  
ii.  Securitization of the loan portfolio was authorized and regulated 
as early as 1993, but it did not develop either. This was due to 
accounting, tax and regulatory factors, as well as lack of 
homogeneity of the securities issued and insufficient experience 
in securitization by the domestic financial intermediaries
17. 
iii.  The macroeconomic environment did not support the 
diversification of the loan portfolio of the CAVs. The capital 
inflows, the high demand for real state and the asset price bubble 
prevented more aggressive diversification plans. Furthermore, the 
lack of experience of CAVs management in other credit markets, 
as reflected in the ex-post excessive growth of consumption and 
commercial PDLs, may have inhibited a faster diversification of 
the loan portfolio. 
 
•  The capital requirements for the CAVs turned out to be too low in terms 
of the ex-post observed volatility of the prices of collateral and the 
probability of a sectoral crisis. The provisions regime was clearly not 
adequate, even when compared with other Latin American countries. 
 
                                                           
16  The loan contracts of the CAVs had fixed interest rates on the indexed stock. Hence, as the cost of funds 
rose, only the new loan contracts could be charged higher rates. 
17 Avella (1998), Las corporaciones de ahorro y vivienda. Itinerario y perspectivas. Mimeo. Banco de la 
República.   15
•  Some CAVs offered some kinds of mortgage loan contracts that allowed 
for initial high leverage ratios of their customers and increased credit 
risk in the future.  
 
CAVs credit growth had slowed down since 1997, while PDLs had been rising fast 
since 1995. With the reversal of capital flows aggregate expenditure weakened and real 
state prices fell by more than 27% in real terms between 1995 and 1999. These events 
prompted a crisis in the CAVs and construction sectors. Increased unemployment and 
rising interest rates impaired the repayment ability of borrowers
18. At the same time, 
falling collateral prices may have induced borrowers to renege on their debts and hand 
in their property to the CAVs. 
 
The results were appalling. Real mortgage credit growth from CAVs went down from 
12.7% in 1997 to 0.3% in 1998 and -11.8% in 1999. The PDL to total loans ratio for 
CAVs rose from 8.7% in 1997 to 13.3% and 22.1% in 1998 and 1999, respectively, 
compared to ratios of   7.1%, 10.7% and 13.8% for the financial system in the same 
years. The solvency ratios were 10.6%, 8.7% and 8.7% for CAVs in those years, while 
the figures for the financial system were 12.4%, 10.6% and 11% in the same period.  
 
c.  The policy response 
 
The response of the authorities to the crisis in the CAVs system was to establish a relief 
program for borrowers in good standing, through loans with softer conditions. Later the 
Constitutional Court issued crucial rulings that changed completely the structure and 
perspectives of long term housing finance. First, the Court reduced the interest rates on 
outstanding mortgage loans and instructed the Board of Directors of the Central Bank 
to establish a maximum rate for mortgage loans in the future. Second, the Court 
detached the indexation formula for mortgage loans from the market interest rate and 
ruled that it must be based only on observed inflation. At the same time, it prohibited 
the use of composite real interest on mortgage loans. Third, the Court forced a 
                                                           
18 Recall that the indexation formula for CAVs loans was linked to the 90 day CD rate.   16
recalculation of the mortgage debt balances using inflation instead of the interest rate as 
the parameter for indexation since 1993 (a period of relatively high real interest rates), 
thus reducing in practice the size of the debts
19. In none of the above rulings did the 
Court distinguish between good standing and delinquent borrowers. 
 
The intervention of the Constitutional Court produced important distortions in the long 
term mortgage and construction financing markets. First, it created a precedent by 
which debt reneging could be protected by the judicial system. The contractual 
uncertainty stemming from such rulings is possibly one of the factors withholding the 
recovery of mortgage loans. Second, it forced CAVs to assume all the interest rate risk. 
A new “Housing Law” was passed to address the challenges posed by the crisis and the 
rulings of the Constitutional Court, but the mechanisms introduced in it have not begun 
to work yet
20. Other instruments like a public fund to insure the interest rate risk on part 
of the mortgage loan stock and a securitization program are being implemented today. 
 
d.  Lessons and challenges ahead 
 
The CAVs experience is an example of a financial sub-sector whose structure and 
regulation after liberalization was not compatible with the more volatile economic 
environment that followed the increase in the size and variability of international capital 
flows. The CAVs system was undercapitalized, especially when the ex-post behaviour 
of real estate prices is considered. The amplified interest rate and liquidity risks 
embedded in the old CAVs structure could not be managed through market mechanisms 
in the context of liberalization and large capital flows, simply because the relevant 
markets or their underlying institutions did not exist. These markets as well as a low 
and stable inflation environment are essential for the provision of long term credit for 
construction, housing or any other sector, if government intervention in credit allocation 
is to be kept at a minimum.   
                                                           
19  The government provided a subsidy to cover the resulting losses of the CAVs. The subsidy was financed 
with a tax on the financial system, collected through mandatory investments.  
20 The Law included, in addition, tax incentives to the holders of “mortgage bonds”, which were intended to 
be the funding source of mortgage loans.   17
 
 
3.  State-owned banks 
 
a. Behavior of the state-owned banks
21 
 
State-owned financial institutions have characteristically maintained efficiency and 
performance indicators lower than those of the private sector. This behavior could be 
attributed to the fact that, because of its nature of state-owned institution, its objectives are 
not necessarily the same as those of private banks. However, this does not seem to be the 
case for most of the state-owned intermediaries during the nineties. Only one bank, the Caja 
Agraria, had functions that differed from the private intermediaries. 
 
Deficiencies within public banking were mainly due to inadequate allocation and follow-up 
of its asset portfolio, which derived in its own deterioration, and to high inefficiency in its 
labor and administrative costs. These factors were reflected in profitability levels extremely 
lower than those shown by their counterparts within the private sector. Graphs 16, 17 and 
18 show the behavior of some indicators that confirm the deficient performance of the sate-
owned banking regarding the previously mentioned aspects. 
 
b. State-owned banks during the financial crisis 
 
During the crisis, state-owned banks performance showed an even more pronounced 
deterioration than that of the private sector as a whole (Graphs 16, 17, 18 and 19). This led 
to a pro-cyclical behavior and generated strong pressure upon public finances. Among the 
reasons explaining the higher vulnerability and the accelerated deterioration of the state-
owned banks are the following: 
  
                                                           
21 The financial intermediaries owned by the public sector are taken into account for the following analysis 
between 1992 and 1996.  For more recent dates the information of the public intermediaries is used for each 
period of time.   18
•  The incentives facing the managers of these banks did not lead them to 
maximize profits, but the size of their loan portfolio. This resulted in high 
operational costs (excessive number of employees or office branches) and 
inadequate credit allocation, granting resources to agents or projects with 
higher marginal risk or which were more sensitive to changes in the 
economic context. Usually the higher risk of these loans was not correctly 
priced (i.e. the interest rates dis not reflect it –Table 3). Also liquidity risk 
was underestimated and public banks relied on short term liabilities more 
than private banks did (Table 4). Public shareholders found costly to monitor 
these actions by managers.  
 
•  Under-capitalization of the public entities, which did not take advantage of 




Liquidity problems were added to these vulnerabilities since mid 1998. Deposits fell due to 
the loss of confidence of institutional investors and the public in general, since a fast 
deterioration of the solvency conditions of these entities was observed
23. The contraction of 
liquidity and the accumulation of losses caused loans to fall faster in the state-owned 
institutions than in the system as a  whole  (Graph 19) 
 
c. Government measures and the fiscal cost of intervention 
 
Government intervention in the solution of state-owned banks crisis focused in performing 
an adequate assessment and qualification of their assets, withdrawing assets with low 
probability of collection from the balance sheets, and capitalizing the entities with fresh 
resources in order to guarantee their solvency and feasibility. Similarly, a merger process of 
the different entities was initiated, suppressing the intermediation activity of those entities 
that were not considered to be feasible. It was expected that the banks resulting from the 
                                                           
22 “Memorias del Ministro de Hacienda”. June 2000 
23  “Memorias del Ministro de Hacienda”. June 2000   19
mergers would be privatized, leaving the Banco Agrario de Colombia (founded in 1999) as 
the only state-owned first floor bank, in charge of the duties of the former Caja Agraria. 
 
This process faced considerable problems stemming from the difficulties in identifying the 
quality and price of the state-owned banks´ assets, and from the fiscal pressures implied by 
the injection of fresh resources to the public banks. In fact, the estimated resources needed 
to restructure the public intermediaries increased as new assessments were performed of the 
asset quality, and as the losses quickly absorbed the net worth of the banks, which placed 
them in risk of being intervened or liquidated by the corresponding agents. The government 
faced this problem by performing partial capitalizations before knowing the true value of 
the whole asset portfolio of the institutions and by applying differential regulation for state-
owned banks that allowed future government commitments to replace the net worth. 
 
Due to the fiscal difficulties, the capitalization of public intermediaries had to be done 
through government bonds. Initially these bonds did not have much liquidity in the 
secondary market, limiting the ability of the capitalization to face the liquidity and financial 
problems of the entities. These problems subsided over time as the liquidity of the bonds 
increased. 
 
The fiscal costs of the government intervention resulted from the need of resources to cover 
losses, to capitalize those banks that continued to operate and to perform the liquidations of 
other banks.  An estimate of the expenses by the government is $7.45 billion
/TN of year 
2000 (equivalent to 4,4% of the GDP)
24. As it usually happens with these estimates, the 
final net cost of the intervention depends on the value of the recovered low quality assets. 
Unfortunately, this process has been very slow, so that a reliable estimate of such income is 
not yet available. 
 
d. Lessons  
 
                                                           
/TN (In Spanish one billion is equivalent to 1,000,0000,000,000) 
24 “Memorias del Ministro de Hacienda”. June 2000   20
•  Due to an inadequate design of incentive schemes and to high monitoring costs 
within the state-owned banks, their performance was systematically poorer than that 
of the private banks carrying out basically the same duties. 
 
•  During the years of financial stress, the state-owned banks´ indicators  deteriorated 
more than the private banks´. This led to the appearance of liquidity and solvency 
problems that caused a pro-cyclical behavior of credit, and generated a high fiscal 
cost during especially difficult macroeconomic circumstances. 
 
•  The squandering of resources caused by the inadequate operation of the state-owned 
banks and the possibility that fragile state-owned banks would deepen the recessive 
phase of the cycle calls for special caution when creating or keeping state-owned 
financial intermediaries in the future. On the contrary, more efficient and 
transparent mechanisms for intervention shall be established should state 
intervention be desirable. 
 
4.  Failures of the regulatory and supervisory framework 
 
Among the main failures in the regulatory and supervisory framework, the following 
deserve to be noticed: 
 
•  As mentioned before, the regulation of CAVs was plagued with problems regarding, 
low capital requirements, an insufficient provisions regime, lack of  regulation 
regarding the treatment of the changes in collateral prices, and the non-exiistence of 
capital requirements to cover the pervasive inerest rate risk. 
 
•  The Bank Superintendency´s treatment of public banks was more lenient than that 
of the private institutions. For example, the Superintendency admitted management 
plans to substitute capital requirements for public banks. Also, a public bank was 
allowed to operate for a long time without reporting its financial statements. 
   21
•  During the 1990s, there were failures in the supervision of the intermediaries 
specialized in the provision of consumption credit. Some of these institutions were 
“financial cooperatives”, and thus were not subject to the minimum regulatory 
requirements applied to “formal” financial intermediaries. For the same reason, their 
supervision was not assigened to the Bank Superintendency, but to another agency 
with lower capacity for surveillance and control. Other consumption credit-oriented 
intermediaries were indeed formal financial institutions, but given their reduced 





•  The rapid structural change undergone by the Colombian financial system in the 
past decade was the result of the following sequence of events: Financial 
liberalization, foreign direct investment, privatization, and the credit boom and 
crisis prompted by the capital flows and the vulnerabilities of specific sub-sectors 
(Savings and Loans Corporations and State-Owned Banks). 
 
•  Liberalization and FDI seemed to have had a generally positive effect on the 
Colombian financial system, since they increased competition, reduced 
intermediation costs and improved the quality of loans in some cases. There is some 
evidence that increased competition by foreign banks may have deteriorated the 
loan quality of domestic banks. 
 
•  Capital flows caused large fluctuations of aggregate expenditure throughout the 
decade. Credit expanded rapidly in the context of a liberalized and growing 
financial sector. The rise in aggregate demand was reflected in an increase of the 
relative prices of non tradable sectors. Real estate prices soared. A reversal in 
capital flows produced a sharp contraction of expenditure and output, and a 
financial crisis ensued. The crisis produced a “credit crunch” from which the 
financial system is just starting to come out.   22
•  The Savings and Loans Corporations were a sub-sector of the financial system that 
enjoyed privileges under the pre-liberalization regime. Liberalization implied the 
elimination of those privileges, leaving these intermediaries with large liquidity and 
interest rate risks that were not covered with higher capital requirements. 
Capitalization was also insufficient to absorb the risk involved in the volatility of 
asset prices (the value of collateral) that followed the wide fluctuations in the capital 
account of the balance of payments.  
 
•  Capital outflows produced initially a liquidity “crunch” for the S&Ls and a rise in 
real interest rates. The latter coupled with the fall in output precipitated a 
deterioration of the quality of the loan portfolio. Also, the sharp drop in real estate 
relative prices may have induced several borrowers to default. 
 
•  The response of the State (particularly the Constitutional Court) to the S&Ls crisis 
may have created serious moral hazard problems that could endanger the provision 
of long term credit in the future. The provision of long term credit may also be 
affected by the inadequate development of the instruments required to hedge the 
interest rate and liquidity risks embedded in the design of mortgage banks. 
 
•  Due to an inadequate design of incentive schemes and to high monitoring costs 
within the state-owned banks, their performance was systematically poorer than that 
of the private banks carrying out the same duties. Managers sought to maximize the 
size of their loan portfolio at the expense of credit and liquidity risks, and 
efficiency. 
 
•  There has been a consolidation of the financial system after the crisis through a 
process of mergers and liquidations. The number of intermediaries has decreased 
and nowadays there are almost as many intermediaries as before the liberalization 
process. Nevertheless, the current concentration of the financial system is lower 
than that of similar countries. Conglomerates play a bigger role in financial 
intermediation than before the crisis. Graph 1
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Real Estate Index / Consumer Price IndexGraph 11
CAPITAL AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNT
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1/  RERI 1994=100, deflacted with PPI, weights: non traditional trade
2/ DTF: deflacted with CPIGraph 14





































































































































































Financial System Public PrivateGraph 15
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Financial System Public PrivateGraph 17



















































































































































Financial System Public PrivateGraph 18
































































































































































Financial System Public PrivateGraph 19
Gross Loans




















































































































































































































Financial System Public PrivateTable 1
















1986-89 91 45.6 --- 29.7 9.1 1.2 19.5 --- 7 --- 8.9
1990 135 64.5 26 29.9 14.1 2.3 13.5 10 10.5 99 24.1
1995 148 67.8 33 34.3 18.6 7.2 8.5 9 14.4 106 19.2
2000 105 61.4 35 33.6 20.3 7.7 5.6 6 11.9 64 15.9
2001 86 52.9 29 25.9 12.8 7.8 5.2 5 8.7 52 18.3
1 As a percentage of GDP
Source: Superintendencia Bancaria








1986-89 65 20 3 43 15 20
1 9 9 0 4 62 2 4 2 11 63 7
1 9 9 5 5 12 71 11 32 12 8
2 0 0 0 5 53 31 3 9 1 92 6
2 0 0 1 4 92 41 51 01 63 5
Table 2
Partipation in the financial system (% of total assets)
Banks
Savings & 
loans Other24.85% 27.05% 27.31% Total Financial System
21.61% 25.34% 24.51% Public  Finan. Institutions




24.85% 27.05% 27.31% Total Financial System
21.61% 25.34% 24.51% Public  Finan. Institutions
25.36% 27.27% 27.67% Private Finan. Institutions
1999 1998 1997
Table 3
IMPLICIT LENDING RATETABLE  4
Structure of Deposits  of Private and Public Banking Institutions
Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private
INTERBANK FUNDS 1.8 1.1 3.4 4.9 7.5 5.5 19.5 4.7 13.1 6.6 6.4 5.9
DEMAND DEPOSITS 43.3 35.5 41.8 25.7 24.0 18.3 19.4 19.1 18.5 24.1 23.5 21.5
SAVING DEPOSITS 34.0 30.1 37.0 37.9 39.8 35.5 36.0 38.3 36.7 32.3 39.4 37.2
TIME DEPOSITS 20.9 33.2 17.9 31.5 28.7 40.8 25.1 37.8 31.7 37.1 30.8 35.3
2000 2001 1996 1997 1998 1999